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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANA PHELPS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SOCIAL SERVICE AND CHILD WEL-
FARE DEPARTMENT OF THE RE-
LIEF SOCIETY GENERAL BOARD 
ASSOCIATION OF THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER - DAY 
SAINTS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
10892 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action instituted against a Licensed Child 
Placement Agency praying for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
commanding the Defendant to return control and custody of 
an infant child. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From an Order, J udg-
ment and Decree for the Defendant, Plaintiff appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant respondent urges the Supreme Court to af-
firm and sustain the findings of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Dana Phelps is a 35 year old woman (Tr. 8) 
who gave birth to a child at the University Hospital on 
December 17, 1966. (Tr. 9) Dana is unmarried and was not 
married at the time of conception or birth of the child. 
(Tr. 10) The child was conceived in March of 1966. (Tr. 9) 
She moved to Salt Lake City in September of 1966 after 
learning of her pregnancy. (Tr. 10) Here she consulted Dr. 
Hebertson, an obstetrician. (Tr. 12) Dana was previously 
acquainted with Dr. Hebertson because of a p:rior unrelated 
hospitalization. (Tr. 12) 
In the latter part of September or the first of October, 
Dana discussed with Dr. Hebertson the possible placement 
of her child for adoption when it was born. (Tr. 12) She 
was told she could go through the L.D.S. Church adoption 
agency if she didn't want to see Father Brusatto of Catholic 
Charities. She was not told which placement she should 
pursue. Dr. Hebertson did, however, suggest this one with 
the Church. (Tr. 13) After several consultations with Dr. 
Hebertson, Dana was told that if she wanted to go through 
the L.D.S. adoption center he would make an appointment. 
Dana told the doctor "yes" she would appreciate it if he 
would. (Tr. 14) An appointment was made with Mrs. 
Bridgewater, Social Worker for the University Hospital and 
subsequently with Mrs. Stewart of the Relief Society. (Tr. 
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15) Prior to the birth of the child Dana had just one visit 
with Mrs. Stewart. (Tr. 15) Dana sought no other advice or 
counsel. (Tr. 16) On the occasion of Dana's visit with Mrs. 
Stewart Dana was informed what the procedures for adop-
tion would be and was shown the paper that she would have 
to sign. (Tr. 19) This conversation occurred September 28, 
1966. (Tr. 61) During said conversation Dana informed 
Mrs. Stewart that she had already decided to place her child. 
Inquiry was made concerning the possibility of marriage 
which appeared to be out of question. (Tr. 61) Dana co-
operated fully at that time, but refused counseling. She 
declined to discuss a wage home situation. (Tr. 62) On 
December 17, 1966 Mrs. Stewart called Dana at the Univer-
sity Hospital by telephone. At that time Dana was informed 
·that Mrs. Stewart was aware of her hospitalization. Mrs. 
Stewart explained that seldom does the agency come on the 
day of delivery and that she would come the day following. 
Mrs. Stewart asked Dana if she was ready to follow through 
on the plans she had previously made and Dana said yes. 
Mrs. Stewart was unable to set the hour on the following 
day that she was to be the:re. Dana responded "fine." (Tr. 
63) On the 18th when Mrs. Stewart arrived at the Univer-
sity Hospital Dana's brother Mr. Phelps was in the room. 
He started to leave, was invited to stay, but declined. (Tr. 
63, 64) The time of the hospital visit by Mrs. Stewart was 
fixed at 3 :05 P.M. (Tr. 38) During the conversation that 
ensued Dana immediately recognized Mrs. Stewart even 
though they had met only once before. Mrs. Stewart visited 
with her, expressing concern about the delivery and "all 
that goes on there." Dana responded "just as normally as 
she did on the first day I met her." (Tr. 64) Mrs. Stewart 
asked Dana whether or not she wanted to follow through 
with the Release and she said "yes I might as well." Mrs. 
Stewart said "please read it, I don't want you to sign 
anything that you are not well acquainted with." Dana was 
acquainted with the Release in the office in September. Mrs. 
Stewart sat quietly while Dana read every part of the Re-
lease. (Tr. 65) Dana inquired how to fill out the forms and 
was told to use her full legal name. A meaningful conversa-
tion transpired in which a discussion occurred about the 
placement of the child. (Tr. 65) Mrs. Stewart responded to 
Dana by informing her that the child could be placed be-
fore Christmas. (Tr. 66) The Release was not only signed 
by Dana but was completed in form in Dana's handwriting. 
(Tr. 66) and (Tr. 27) 
A significant part of the conversation occurring on the 
afternoon of December 18th, between Dana and Mrs. Stew-
art is related on Page 74 of the Transcript. Dana in response 
to the proffer of the Release said "I might as well do it now." 
Mrs. Stewart construed this as "an unequivocal consent to 
the adoption, considering the fact that this was the direction 
in which the groundwerk had been laid. There was no un-
certainty at any time on her part shown." (Tr. 74) 
Shortly thereafter the child was placed for adoption. 
On December 21, 1966 Dana executed an authority for hos-
pital release of the child. This form was witnessed by Cor-
inne B, Bridgewaters, Social Worker for the University 
Hospital (See medical records Exhibit P. 1, page 6) The 
circumstances surrounding the execution of this document 
are related by Mrs. Bridgewaters. On December 19th Mrs. 
Bridgewaters visited with Dana at 9 :00 o'clock in the morn-
ing. She asked Dana if she was ready and took it in a posi-
tive way that Dana was still planning on going through with 
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her adoption. Dana told Mrs. Bridgewaters that Mrs. Stew-
art had been in to see here and had taken the adoption Re-
lease. Dana "seemed to be relieved" and Dana said "I'm glad 
it's all over." At this point Mrs. Bridgewaters informed Dana 
that she would return the following day to obtain the signa-
ture on the Hospital Release of the Child. (Tr. 114.) This 
release should not be confused with the mother's consent to 
adoption. The conversation also was "meaningful" and 
Dana said that she felt fine. (Tr. 115) It should be noted 
that Dana was acquainted with Mrs. Bridgewaters having 
met her originally on September 23, 1966 in Mrs. Bride-
waters' office (Tr. 111 At that meeting Mrs. Bridgewaters 
relates ''there was not too much to making this decision 
of adoption, Dana seemed to have this already planned 
and of course I, after explaining my role, asked Dana 
specifically if this is what she wanted to do ... I thought 
it was significant that Dana wanted to place her baby 
and she said that she had heard about the L.D.S. Relief 
Society and wanted to place her baby and I know by my 
records and after I talked with Dana I found out that she 
was Catholic and I commented that her being Catholic and 
if she wouldn't want to place the baby there. But that it was 
her decision and any of these agencies were very good and 
I pointed out too ... we talked about four agencies and the 
Child Welfare ... " (Tr. 112) Dana and Mrs. Bridgewaters 
discussed the alternatives of her keeping the child but Dana 
felt that an adoption was the best thing to do. She indicated 
no overt feelings around the influence from her family. 
(Tr. 113) 
While the child was delivered by a caesarean section, the 
circumstances of delivery, the patient's progress and medi-
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cation given were not unordinary. She was fatigued but 
comfortable. She slept throughout the night (Tr. 86) and 
in the early morning hour, at 5 :00 o'clock was given Viste-
rol, which is a sedative and histamine, a non-narcotic. At 
12 :30 P.M. she was given a minimal dose of demerol and a 
repeat of Visterol. At 5 :40 A.M. on the morning of Decem-
ber 18th she received 10 miligrams of morphine. (Tr. 87, 88) 
The dosage given was considered by the doctor to be small. 
(Tr. 88) According to the doctor, the dosage of Demerol 
given at 9 :40 in the morning would have worn off two hours 
after. (Tr. 92) During the day the doctor was in the hospital 
and visited with Dana on several occasions. He documents 
a visit at 6 :00 in the afternoon. The doctor found no indica-
tion of sleep deprivation (Tr. 93) and no evidence of idiosyn-
cracies which would cause an unexpected reaction to the 
medications given. It was the doctor's opinion that Dana 
was fully competent on the 18th of December to sign the 
requested Release document. The testimony of Dr. Hebert-
son as contained in Transcript 93, 94, 95, and 96 is most 
significant in this regard. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF EXECUTION OF 
THE RELEASE AND CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION 
OF HER INFANT SON HAD FULL UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCE OF HER ACT 
AND WAS NOT ACTING UNDER SUCH UNDUE IN-
FLUENCE, RESTRAINT, MENACE, FRAUD OR OTHER 
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ACTION AS TO RENDER HER ACT AN INVOLUN-
TARY ONE. 
Counsel for Appellant argues that at no time did Dana 
ever unequivocally express her desire to release her child or 
place the same for adoption. The record discloses a pattern 
of behavior which can only reasonably be construed as an 
unequivocal decision to proceed. Her conversation with the 
doctor in which she solicited his advice and her statement 
to him that she would like him to arrange the appointment 
with the agency is suggestive of this fact. (Tr. 14) Dana 
further informed Mrs. Stewart of her desire to proceed with 
the adoption without regard to the other services that the 
agency afforded, such as counseling. (Tr. 61) 
Dana at no time, to the social worker, the doctor, the 
nurse or the agency representative expressed indecision or 
hesitancy about her predetermined course of action. 
Her assertion that she was under undue influence was 
unconvincing to the trial court, and is not supported under 
the facts. 
One raises the question, "Did Dr. Hebertson exercise 
undue influence?" Dr. Hebertson was a confident of Dana. 
He had become acquainted with her previously and she had 
sought him out for treatment and consultation in connection 
with the problems incident to her pregnancy. (Tr. 12) Who 
is better able to advise a patient concerning matters which 
are both physical and emotional than her own selected 
physician? We refer the Court to the case In Re Adoption of 
a Minur, 79 App. DC 191, 144 F 2d 644, 156 ALR 1001, in 
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which it was held that since the originally executed consent 
was made with the advice of a family physician and since 
the mother and her parents had considered the matter for 
some time previously the contention that the consent was 
not voluntarily given or was without knowledge of its con-
sequences was without merit. 
Consider the case of In Re Adoption of D ...... 122 
Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223. In this case the trial court found 
that Appellant was not a victim of duress or undue influ-
ence. She had had many months to consider the matter. She 
had had conferences with her grandmother, and other rela-
tives, and with counsel for the Respondent in that case and 
thereafter voluntarily appeared before the Court where she 
was questioned concerning her attitude and desires and 
where she freely signed the relinquishment and consent. 
Dana, too, had many months to consider her course of 
action. Some four months prior to the birth of the child she 
made contact with the agency by appointment through the 
offices of Dr. Hebertson. Dr. Hebertson had offered to make 
the appointment if she desired to go through with an adop-
tion. Dana's answer to this inquiry was that she did and 
would appreciate it if he would make such an appointment. 
(Tr. 14) 
Counsel for Appellant suggests that Dana was under 
the influence of medication or narcotic which so impaired 
her judgment as to render her act involuntary. In support 
of this position Appellant brings into the Court the testi-
mony of Dr. Clark, a psychiatrist. Let us analyze Dr. Clark's 
position in this matter. 
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1. He was not the attending physician. (Tr. 52) and 
(Tr.42) 
2. He had never seen Dana until the day before trial. 
At the time of this examination he gave her no medication. 
He did not observe her personally under the influence of 
any narcotic drug or synthetic narcotic. (Tr. 52) 
3. In answer to the question, "Doctor, in your opinion 
would it have been difficult for Miss Phelps to make a de-
cision such as signing a consent in the state of mind that 
you feel she was in?" his answer was, "I can't quite answer 
your question in terms of 'would it be difficult for her'." 
(Tr. 49) 
4. He relies upon a repetitious request concerning the 
time of day and suggests that such behavior is abnormal. It 
occurs to counsel that Dana was waiting for the arrival of 
a social worker preliminary to executing a consent to an 
adoption. She had received a call the day before, but the 
social worker could not inform her of the exact time that she 
would arrive the following day. Such could well create some 
anxiety or interest as to the time of arrival of the social 
worker. We respectfully submit that the uncertainty as to 
time of arrival and the normal anxieties that might exist 
under such circumstances could prompt a repetitious request 
for the time of day. Doubtless, many persons under trying 
circumstances have solicited a frequent disclosure of time. 
Such repetitious requests may be remotely characteristic of 
an abnormal state of mind but are not conclusive in any way 
of this fact. Dr. Clark was quick to qualify his answer by 
stating categorically that such in and of itself would not 
constitute incompetence. (Tr. 51, 52) 
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5. The doctor could not answer regarding the degree of 
competency that Dana might have in coping with specific 
types of problems presented to her. (Tr. 53) The doctor 
sums his testimony up inescapably with the words "I am not 
saying she was incapable of a voluntary act." (Tr. 57) 
Consider now in contrast the testimony of Dr. Hebert-
son 
1. Dr. Hebertson was the attending physician. (Tr. 12) 
2. He is a trained obstetrician, a member of the staff of 
the University Hospital. (Tr. 76) 
3. He was a personal choice of Dana Phelps; she having 
become acquainted with him previously. (Tr. 12) 
4. On the first visit Dana expressed to the doctor a 
desire for adoption. (Tr. 77) Subsequently, an appointment 
was arranged at her request with the licensed agency. (Tr. 
14) Alternatives were discussed. (Tr. 78) 
5. Dana reaffirmed her desire to go forward with an 
adoption. (Tr. 79) 
6. At no time did Dana negate such a desire. (Tr. 78, 
79) 
7. Dr. Hebertson made inquiry as to her medical his-
tory reaction to medications. (Tr. 79) He made no clinical 
evaluations concerning adverse effects of demoral. He knew 
of nothing to cause him to be concerned or reticent about 
administering it to her. (Tr. 80) There was no adverse re-
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action to such medication. Dana responded in the usual 
fashion to demerol. 
8. The doctor visited with her twice a day or on a num-
ber of occasions. (Tr. 82) 
9. He carried on a meaningful conversation with her 
both before and after the birth of the child and shortly after 
the time for the execution of the release. (Tr. 82) 
10. Dana's responses were appropriate, rational and re-
sponsive. (Tr. 82) The doctor and Dana chatted about the 
ordinary things following surgery. (Tr. 83) 
11. The doctor had seen her prior to the birth of the 
child on at least ten occasions. (Tr. 84) 
12. The medication given her was a small dose. (Tr. 88) 
13. In the doctor's opinion, Dana was fully competent. 
The primary effects of any medication had been passed at 
the time of execution of the release. (Tr. 92, 93) 
Now if Dana was unable to comprehend the conse-
quences of her act and this fact were known or thought to be 
by those closest to her, one may ask, "why did the brother 
decline to stay in the room at the time the release was exe-
cuted? Why did he make no attempt to stop the case worker 
or counsel or confer with her? Why did he voluntarily leave 
the room notwithstanding an invitation to stay, and why 
did he fail to pursue any misgivings which he might have 
with the caseworker upon her departure from Dana's hospi-
tal room? The answer is obvious. 
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It is significant that Dana did carry on a meaningful 
conversation, did receive the case worker, did interrogate 
Mrs. Stewart concerning the contents of the document, how 
it should be filled out and when and where the child would 
be placed. It is also significant that Dana filled out the re-
lease and expressed reflief when the ordeal was passed. 
In the case of Barnum 1.:s. R6idy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P. 2d 
175, the Court observes that, generally speaking, there is 
always present a form of duress when a consent to adoption 
is executed but it is not duress of a type which renders void 
such consent. 
Admittedly, Dana was under some social pressure. She 
was no doubt troubled and anxious. Her predicament was 
understandable yet regrettable. Dana did what might be 
expected. She made a disclosure of her predicament first to 
her family. She then solicited the advice and help of a phy-
sician. She subsequently met with a social worker and then 
a licensed agency representative, also a social worker. Nev-
ertheless, the opinion and the decision were hers, not 
theirs; and with rational judgment she elected to proceed 
toward an adoption. The execution of the document of con-
sent was but one in a series of steps which Dana had taken 
leading toward an adoption of her child. If advice is con-
strued as duress thereby rendering any act pursuant to such 
advice void, then the valued purposes served by lawyers, 
doctors and social workers would be nullified and each 
troubled person would be left in a sea of doubt to flounder 
and sink for lack of such advice and guidance. 
Dana was not under such duress, restraint or undue in-
fluence at the time the decision was made to release the child 
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for adoption and at the time of the execution of the consent 
as to render her act involuntary and void. If indeed there 
has been undue influence or duress, such has been brought 
to bear subsequent to the critical acts herein and not as a 
part of such acts. We invite the Court to consider the case of 
Thomas vs. Children's Aid Society, 12 Utah 2d 235 and 364 
P. 2d 1069. In that case where it appeared that the mother 
voluntarily signed the document after having been thorough-
ly advised as to its legal effect and consequences, the ascer-
tion of duress and coercion was not supported by the 
evidence. 
The trial court is charged by law with fairly consider-
ing the evidence and giving such weight thereto as is appro-
priate. In the instant case the court fairly considered the 
testimony of the witnesses called in behalf of the parties, 
their demeanor, their directness and candor, their profes-
sional ability, and the personal knowledge which they might 
have in connection with Dana's situation. In doing so, the 
court acted properly in finding that there was no undue in-
fluence, restraint, duress, menace or fraud. 
POINT TWO 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF'S AC-
TION IN SIGNING A RELEASE AND CONSENT OF 
ADOPTION WAS A PRODUCT OF MUCH THOUGHT 
AND MANY MONTHS OF CONSIDERATION AND 
WAS THE CULMINATION OF A PREDETERMINED 
COURSE OF ACTION. 
The child in question was born on December 17, 1966, 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Consider the following facts: 
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1. Prior to September of 1966 Dana conferred with her 
brother, a doctor, in Price, Utah, concerning her problem, 
having learned of her pregnancy in August of 1966. (Tr. 10) 
2. In the latter part of September, 1966, she conferred 
with Dr. Hebertson, an obstetrician and personal choice of 
appellant. (Tr. 12) 
3. At that time she discussed with Dr. Hebertson the 
possible placement of the child for adoption. (Tr. 12) He 
explained that she could go through the L.D.S. Church adop-
tion agency, if she didn't want to go see Father Brusatto. 
(Tr. 13) He advised her to place the child for adoption. 
(Tr. 13) 
Dr. Hebertson expressed a willingness to make an ap-
pointment with the L.D.S. Adoption Center if this was 
Dana's choice. Dana responded that it was and asked him 
to do so. (Tr. 14) 
5. The doctor's notes revealed an expressed desire for 
adoption. (Tr. 77) 
6. The doctor discussed the alternatives available to 
Dana. (Tr. 78) 
7-She reaffirmed her desire to go forward with an adop-
tion and did nothing to negate this desire. (Tr. 79) 
8-The doctor saw Dana prior to the birth of the child on 
at least ten occasions, and on those occasions "because of 
her express desire for adoption" supported her in this de-
cision. (Tr. 84) 
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9. Dana on the single occasion of her conference with 
Mrs. Stewart of the Defendant agency, occurring September 
28, 1966, explored various alternatives available to her, 
filled out various forms and applications, declined counsel-
ing. (Tr. 62) 
10. Her next contact with Mrs. Stewart was on Decem-
ber 17, Hl66, by telephone at which time Mrs. Stewart asked 
if she was ready to follow through on the plans that she had 
previously made and Dana replied, "yes." Arrangements 
were made for Mrs. Stewart to visit with her the following 
day and to take the release. (Tr. 63) 
11. On the 23rd day of September, 1966, Dana met with 
Corinne Bridgewaters, a social worker for the University 
Hospital. Dana came to her office. Mrs. Bridgewaters says 
that "there was not too much to making this decision of 
adoption. Dana seemed to have this already planned; and, of 
course, I, after explaining my role asked Dana specifically 
if this is what she wanted to do and then I went away from 
this particular area of discussion and we talked about her 
family ... I thought it was significant that Dana wanted to 
place her baby and she said that she had heard about the 
L.D.S. Relief Society and wanted to place her baby ... " 
12. Some four months later, after the birth of the child, 
Mrs. Bridgewaters visited with Dana, assumed that the re-
lease had not yet been signed, then inquired of her as to 
whether or not she was ready "to sign the release." On this 
occasion, to-wit: December 19th, Dana told Mrs. Bridge-
waters that the release had been signed and Dana "seemed 
to be relieved." She said, "I am glad it is all over." (Tr. 112) 
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13. Subsequently, Dana ratified her action by signing a 
second release document pertaining to the child's discharge 
from the hospital. (Tr. 114, Exhibit P. 2, Page 6) 
The weight and preponderance of the evidence supports 
Respondent's contention that Plaintiff had pre-determined 
to release her child and that the mere act of signing the re-
lease and relinquishment was the culmination of this pre-
determination rather than the beginning of her indecision. 
POINT THREE 
THE CHILD IN QUESTION WAS PLACED BY 
THE AGENCY IN A SUITABLE AND PROPER HOME 
FOR ADOPTION PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS BY 
PLAINTIFF. 
Appellant suggests that the record is void of any evi-
dence concerning the placement of the child. 
The child in question was placed by the agency in a 
suitable and proper home and this fact was communicated 
not only to the Appellant but is acknowledged by her in her 
own testimony. We refer the Court to the testimony of Dana 
Phelps. At some time after the birth of the child she ap-
proached the Relief Society and inquired if the baby was all 
right. At that time Mrs. Stewart informed her that the baby 
was in a home like "yours" (Dana's), a professional home, 
that it would be best for you (Dana) to just leave the baby 
where it is. (Tr. 22) Mrs. Stewart did not tell her where the 
baby was located except in a very general way. She assured 
her about the child's welfare and confirmed that it was a 
kind of home that Dana would select for it. (Tr. 75) 
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The Court is mindful that the respondent is a State 
licensed Child Placement Agency and as such is subject to 
regulation and review by the State Department of Public 
Welfare. The agency operates under the rules, regulations 
and standards prescribed by the Welfare Department and 
is and was judicious in the selection of a home for placement 
of a child in its care. We invite the Court's judicial knowl-
edge of the licensing procedures and standards prescribed 
for the operation of such agencies. 
P01NT FOUR. 
UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AD-
DUCED, THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE PERMIT-
' TED TO REVOKE OR WITHDRAW CONSENT AS 
PREVIOUSLY GIVEN. 
We direct the Court's attention to the language of Ex-
hibit "P" 3, entitled Release. This release is contractual in 
form and in the most precise terms declares the mother's 
fixed determination to place her child with the agency for 
adoption. The mother agrees to not interfere with, nor at-
tempt in any manner to locate the child, and by the terms of 
the document foregoes all parental rights and control over 
the child. The mother declares a previously informed inten-
tion, after carefully considering the matter, to never claim 
any right, title or interest in and to the child and authorizes 
the agency to forthwith place the child in a suitable and 
proper home for adoption. The mother declares that she has 
carefully read the release and knows the contents thereof 
and signs the same as her own free act and deed. 
It was based upon this agreement that the agency un-
dertook placement of the child in a "professional home." 
18 
The mother's consent to adoption was voluntarily given and 
was acted upon by the adopting parents. As such, it cannot 
be withdrawn without good cause. So the court has held in 
In Re Adoption of D ...... 122 Utah, 525, 252 P. 2d 229. 
A special point should be made that the release afore-
mentioned was executed in strict conformance to the stat-
utes of Utah. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-30-4. 
Appellant suggests that the case of Taylor vs. Wad-
daups, found in 121 Utah 279, 241 P. 2d 157 is not suppor-
tive of this proposition. We respectfully submit that the 
Taylor vs. W addaups Case involves circumstances in which 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-
30-4 were not complied with. In other words, no valid con-
sent had in the first instance been given. As such, the case 
is clearly distinguishable on all points of law. It should be 
pointed out that the Waddaups case was not an agency adop-
tion and did not conform to the statues for non-agency place-
ment. In that case, the court could not conclude other than 
it did. 
Distinguish the Waddaups Case from the instant case. 
Dana Phelps executed a valid release, having been fully ad-
vised as to the legal consequences therein. After having exe-
cuted the release and in reliance upon Appellant's voluntary 
act is so doing, the respondent placed the child forthwith in 
a suitable and proper home. 
This Court in the case of In Re Adoption of D ..... . 
122 Utah 525, 252 P. 2d 229 adopts the rules set forth in 
the Nevada case of Ex Parte Schultz, 64 Nevada 264, 181 
P. 2d 585, as follows: 
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"The court therein refers to four fundamental 
doctrines inherent in our ideas of justice, all of which 
militate against any arbitrary right of appellant to 
revoke her consent: 
First, Principles of contract require that where 
it has been represented to the respondents initially 
by the grandmother and later by the appellant that 
they could adopt a child if they would assume paren-
tal responsibility and take care of her, which offer 
they accepted, have performed and are ready, willing 
and able to continue, prevent the arbitrary revoca-
tion of the contract. The authorities uniformly dis-
cussed the agreement to adopt as a contract ... After 
acceptance such a contract is enforceable against the 
adopting parents and ought to be enforceable by 
them. 
Second, Estoppel and other principles of equity 
under the circumstances would preclude a court from 
assisting appellant to regain the custody of the child. 
The contention that no rights have intervened and no 
one has relied on the representations to his detriment 
show a singular lack of understanding of human 
nature. It is confirmed by experience and common 
sense that when people who desire a child ... once fix 
their parental instincts and emotions upon a child 
which has been rejected or forsaken by others they 
have great love, affection and concern for such child. 
There are those who maintain that under such cir-
cumstances the parental love and desire to protect 
and care for the child is even more intense than in 
the case of natural parents ... A realistic appraisal 
of the situation compels us to recognize that persons 
such as respondents who have done what they have 
for this child must be assumed to have an affection 
and attachment for her at least equally important to 
property rights. Viewed in that light there certainly 
have intervened "vested rights" and respondents 
have in reliance upon representations made placed 
themselves in a different position, the undoing of 
which would cause irreparable injury in the most 
•,I . 
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real sense. Appellant not only stood by and knowing-
ly permitted but actually encouraged such circum-
stances to eventuate and further formally executed 
the consent to adoption. Under such facts she should 
in equity and good conscience be estopped to re-
assert her rights to custody. 
Third, the welfare of the child ... when ques-
tions of child custody arise the welfare of the child 
and her chances for a suitable home environment and 
advantages in nurture, training and education to the 
end that she may live and be conditioned for a well 
adjusted happy and useful life are important factors 
to consider. In fact, it is often stated that such con-
siderations are of the paramount importance. In the 
case of Walton vs. Koffrnan, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 
97 Mr. Justice Wade analyses the antecedent cases 
of this court regarding contests over children and 
cogently sets forth this principle but recognizes that 
the right of the natural parent may be surrendered 
or lost. When a parent has failed to give the child 
the attention and love normally to be expected, has 
abandoned its care to others and by irresponsible 
conduct shown an unwillingness or an inability to 
measure up to parental responsibility these matters 
may be taken into consideration by the court in con-
nection with other factors in determining the right 
of custody. 
Fourth, public policy favors the adoption of 
children who are left without parental refuge. Once 
a child has been cast adrift and is without respon-
sible parental care, the policy of the law should be to 
assist in every way in establishing a satisfactory 
parent/child and family relationship. Adoptive par-
ents should not be discouraged by a construction of 
the law which would cause them to fear the conse-
quences of accepting a child because of the knowl-
edge that the fate of their efforts would be at the will 
of the natural parent." In Re Adoption of D ..... . 
122 Utah 525, 252 P. 2d 229. 
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POINT FIVE 
TO ALLOW REVOCATION OF A RELEASE AND 
CONSENT TO ADOPTION WHERE SUCH IS PROPER-
LY GIVEN TO A LICENSED AGENCY IN CONFORM-
ANCE WITH STATE LAW WOULD BE CONTRARY 
TO THE ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY OF THIS 
STATE. 
Some Courts have stated that a consent once having 
been freely and formally given may not be revoked except 
for fraud or duress and that in the absence of fraud, coercion 
or other cause rendering the mother's consent inoperative, 
the fact that after signing an adoption agreement she has 
changed her mind and attempted to withdraw her consent 
would not relieve her of her agreement. See Am. Jur. 2d 
898. Dana Phelps entered into a contract for the placement 
of her child (Exhibit "B" 3). Based upon the covenants and 
agreements therein contained the agency received the child 
and thereupon placed said child in a suitable and proper 
home for adoption. This was done in conformance with the 
standards and rules of the State Welfare Department and 
in compliance with the provisions of Utah law as they relate 
to agency placements. 
Interestingly Appellant concedes that an adoption con-
sent may not be revoked without cause and then only if the 
adoption proceedings have not been commenced. He points 
to the case of In Re Trimble's Adoption, 16 Utah 2d 188, 
398 P. 2d 25, in which the Court held that an adoption pro-
ceeding is commenced by filing a petition with the Clerk of 
the District Court. We respectfully submit that the distinc-
tion between the Trimble Case and the case at hand is in the 
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character of the placement. The Trimble Case was a non-
agency adoption involving a question of jurisdiction between 
the Juvenile and the District Court. Under the circumstances 
of the Trimble Case the adoption consent was taken in Open 
Court after the filing of a petition for adoption. Not so in 
the case of an agency placement; in agency placements the 
proceeding is commenced when the first requirement im-
posed by law is performed leading in a natural way toward a 
concluded adoption. This requirement is the execution of the 
mother's release, not before the Court, as in the case of an in-
dependent adoption but before an officer authorized to take 
acknowledgements as required by Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, Section 78-30-4. In establishing procedures for the 
execution of a release to an agency the legislature recog-
nizes the social training, legal controls, exact standards, and 
proper motivation of the agency in performing its necessary 
public service. It is apparent to any informed person that 
the social good and service performed by licensed agencies 
fills a void which would otherwise exist in this state. The 
agency provides social service to unwed mothers and place-
ment services to children who are born out of wedlock or 
otherwise left without proper parental supervision. The 
services of the agency can be invoked by the Court or by 
voluntary action of a distressed individual, in this case, 
Appellant. 
The function of the agency is to stabilize family life 
and to provide social welfare help where such need exists. 
Essential to the operation of the agency is a flow of 
adoptive parent applicants. To assure this flow, the agencies, 
under the direction of the Welfare Department have estab-
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lished standards and procedures and have, heretofore, rep-
resented that upon the family meeting the standards 
prescribed such applicants would be eligible to adopt a child. 
Consider any given case-an applicant to adopt a child solic-
its the cooperation of the agency. Such applicants estab-
lishes his or their qualifications for adoption. Based upon 
such standards the agency in due course places a child with 
the applicant for adoption. The applicants thereupon take 
the child into their home, solely provide for its needs, shower 
said child with love, affection, parental supervision and 
guidance, and create for the child a socially desirable family 
unit, indeed an essential environment for the child's normal 
development. 
We respectfully submit that were it the law that the 
placement could not be regarded as stable and essentially 
secure from the first moment, and if the natural mother 
could "willy-nilly" rescind and revoke her consent without 
reasonable cause or basis the applications for adoption 
would be so diminished and impaired as to destroy the ef-
fectiveness of adoption practices in this community. Such 
was not the intention of our legislature and is not the rule 
which has been adopted heretofore by this Court. Were per-
sons desirous, even under such undesirable circumstances to 
adopt they would tend to withhold their affection, their 
normal parental responses, their emotional outpourings, 
and their means until such time as the adoption has become 
final. Nothing could be more disastrous to a child in its for"' 
mative years; indeed nothing could be more socially disas-
trous to our community. 
It was with this thought in mind that the legislature 
enacted the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec-
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tion 55-10-42 which provide "no parent or guardian or other 
person who by instrument in writing surrenders or has sur-
rendered heretofore the custody of a child to any children's 
aid society or institution shall thereafter contrary to the 
terms of such instrument be entitled to custody or control or 
authority over or any right to interfere with any such child 
and the same conditions shall prevail where the child is or 
has been delivered to a children's aid society or institution 
by action of any proper court." 
The foregoing statute was enacted in 1903 and con-
tinued as a statutory declaration until 1965, at which time 
the same was repealed. We suggest that the repeal was 
through inadvertence on the part of the legislature. The 
Court will recall that in 1965 the legislature drafted a new 
Juvenile Court Act. The foregoing statute was contained in 
the old Juvenile Court Act and was the victim of a blanket 
repeal of some 62 sections of the former law. 
An examination of the statutes repealed at that time 
will show that in a substantial part all such statutes related 
to administration and to procedures followed by the Juvenile 
Court under the old act. We respectfully submit that the 
repeal of this important section of substantive law was not 
a reflection of the intention of the legislature but was acci-
dental and incidental to a revision of administrative prac-
tices. Said section was a substantive principle buried in a 
procedural section of the Juvenile Court Act. 
Notwithstanding the repeal of Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, Section 55-10-42 the principle and concept underlying 
and expressed by said section has been adopted by our Utah 
Court as a part of its substantive case law. We refer the 
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Court to the case of Thomas vs. Children's Aid Society of 
Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P. 2d 1029, In Re Adoption of 
D ...... 252 P. 2d 223, 122 Utah 525; Jacob vs. State by and 
through Public W eljare Commission, 7 Utah 2d 304, 322 P. 
2d 720. 
It is interesting to note that our Utah Legislature 
while inadvertently repealing Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Section 55-10-42 nevertheless reflected in other legislation 
an affirmative intention to strengthen and secure stable 
child placement. It is significant that in 1965, Section 78-30-
4 was amended. In the amendment the legislature provided : 
... A minor parent shall have the power to con-
sent to the adoption of such parent's child, and a 
minor parent shall have the power to release such 
parent's control or custody of such parent's child to 
any agency licensed to receive children for placement 
or adoption under Chapter 8, Title 55, and, such a 
consent or release so executed shall be valid and have 
the same force and effect as a consent or release exe-
cuted by an adult parent. A minor parent, having so 
executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same 
upon such person's attaining the age of maturity. 
It would be an incongruous thing to suggest that an 
adult parent could revoke her consent without cause where-
as a minor, near adulthood, could not. Obviously this was not 
the legislative intent. The legislative intent was to bar dis-
affirmance and revocation and to lend further stability to 
the placement of a child. Such intent is supportive of a sim-
ilar intent in all areas of adoption-placement practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that Dana Phelps 
freely and voluntarily relinquished the custody and control 
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of her child to the respondent with full knowledge and un-
derstanding of the legal consequences of her act. The Court 
is faced with the alternatives of upholding the findings of 
the trial court and the precedence of this court, thereby 
serving the best interest of the child and further stabilizing 
adoption placement services in this State, or returning the 
child to a 35 year old unmarried woman who cannot and 
does not offer to the child a normal family life and a well-
adjusted father-mother environment. Respondent, in its 
own behalf, on behalf of the adopting parents of the infant 
Phelps, on behalf of adoptive applicants similarly situated 
elsewhere, on behalf of needful children, and on behalf of 
licensed agencies throughout the State of Utah earnestly 
solicits the Court's consideration of these matters and their 
import upon the infant Phelps and upon adoption practices 
within this State in affirming the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SPAFFORD & YOUNG 
Earl S. Spafford 
